Hastings Law Journal
Volume 34 | Issue 3

Article 1

1-1983

Eliminating the Defect in Design Strict Products
Liability Theory
John L. Diamond

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John L. Diamond, Eliminating the Defect in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 Hastings L.J. 529 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol34/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Eliminating the "Defect" in Design
Strict Products Liability Theory
by JOHN L. DIAMOND*
Since the concept of strict products liability was introduced by Justice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc.,' courts have
struggled to define what standards should govern imposition of such
liability. In cases alleging improper design, the struggle has centered
on the definition of "defective" design. 2 The varied responses stem in

part from continued judicial attempts to incorporate warranty and negligence theories into purported strict liability standards. 3 This mixed
tradition is reflected in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts which defines "defect" using both the negligence concept of unreasonably dangerous defect and the warranty standard of the ordinary
4
consumer's expectations.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, Umversity of California.
B.A., 1972, Yale College; Dipl. Crim., 1973, Cambridge University; J.D., 1976, Columbia
Law School.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of James
Corbelli, Class of 1983, Hastings College of the Law, Umversity of California. The author
would also like to express lis gratitude to Professors Wayne D. Brazil, David J. Jung and
David I. Levine of Hastings College of the Law, University of California, Professor Edmund
Ursm of Unversity of San Diego School of Law and Lucia M. Walters, teaching fellow,
Stanford Law School, for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this article.
1. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
2. Strict products liability has been applied by courts only upon a showing that the
product was sold in a "defective condition.' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment g (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT 2d]. Dean Prosser stated it
be something wrong with the product." W PROSSEI, HANDBOOK
simply: "There must
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 659 (4th ed. 1971).

Under strict products liability theory, liability is inposed for physical harm caused by a
defective product even if "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product." RESTATEMENT 2d, supra, § 402A. Strict products liability is to be
distinguished from traditional strict liability, which is unposed upon "[olne who carries on
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent
an abnormally dangerous activity
the harm." Id § 519(a). Liability "is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous." Id § 519(2). Thus, in strict products liability
cases the focus is on the defective condition of the product, while in tradiuonal strict liability
the focus is on the activity engaged in by the defendant.
3. See infra notes 38-43 & accompanying text.
4. RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 2, § 402A provides:
[5291
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This Article examines the Restatement's attempt to formulate a
theory of design products liability based on the concept of "defective
design" and concludes that a definition of "defect" in terms of consumer expectations is so ambiguous as to virtually beg the question.
Alternative responses to the Restatement standard are examined and
found either indistinguishable from negligence theory or lacking a

valid policy rationale.
The ambiguities and uncertainties engendered by the conflicting
standards in design cases are a result of courts' attempts to define strict

products liability in terms of "defective design." So long as liability
depends on a determination of defectiveness, courts must concentrate
on the issue of what constitutes a design defect, a task that has proved

persistently difficult. 5

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The term "unreasonably dangerous" is defined as "dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id, comment i. It is further
noted that "[t]here is nothing in this Section which would prevent any court from treating
the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the user or consumer. But if this is done, it
should be recognized and understood that the "warranty" is a very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to the various
contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales." fd, comment m.
5. See infra notes 38-44 & accompanying text.
Design defects should be distinguished from manufacturing defects. As Professor Birnbaum observed: "The problems of defining defect are further complicated because the same
linguistic formulation is used to describe two entirely distinct factual clusters. The term
defect is used to apply to product flaws that result from unintentional mishaps in manufacturing as well as to flaws that arise from intentional design decisions. In the case of a manufacturing defect, the meaning of defect creates no difficulty: the product at issue may be
evaluated against the manufacturer's own production standards, as manifested by other like
products that roll off the assembly line. Conscious design defect cases, however, provide no
such simple test. Plaintiff is attacking the intended design itself, arguing that the design
created unreasonable risks of harm. In attacking the product's design, the plaintiff is not
impugning the manufacturer's product so much as the manufacturer's choice of design."
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Testfor Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980). See Henderson, JudicialReview of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1531 (1973); Traynor, he Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32

January 1983]

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY STANDARDS

531

It is submitted that rather than imposing strict liability for socalled design defects, application of strict liability in the traditional
sense would provide a more workable standard in products liability
cases. 6
Such an approach would provide compensation for many injured
consumers and at the same time assure that the manufacturer and supplier of a product would be forced to pay only for injuries which in a
sense are statistically foreseeable. As a result of the imposition of traditional strict liability, manufacturers and suppliers would include compensation for injury as a cost of doing business. Such a standard would
encourage proper insurance coverage and encourage safety measures
and responsible marketing.
At the very least, traditional strict liability should apply not only
to those engaging in "abnormally dangerous" activities, as defined by
the Restatement, 7 but also to those manufacturers and suppliers of dangerous products which substantially contribute to making such activities abnormally dangerous.
It is arguable that traditional strict liability also should be extended to products not associated with abnormally dangerous activities,
just as it can be argued that additional non-abnormally dangerous activities associated with particular products should be subject to strict
liability. It is the dividing line between negligence and strict liability
that should be the focus of debate, however, and not what is or is not a
design defect.
The Origins of Products Liability Theory
Since Justice Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. ,8 a succession of leading decisions has given consumers substantial
remedies against manufacturers and distributors of mass produced
goods.9 In MacPherson,the New York Court of Appeals abolished the
requirement of privity which had precluded most consumers from
maintaining negligence claims against the manufacturers of defective
TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Wade, On Product "DesignDefects" and Their Actionabilily, 33
VAND. L. Rrv. 551 (1980).
6. For the distinction between strict products liability and traditional strict liability,
see supra note 2. Negligence in the manufacturing or designing of a product should, of
course, remain an alternative basis of liability. See infra notes 12-13 & accompanying text.
7. See RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 2, §§ 519-20.
8. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
9. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Prosser, Assault]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MiiN. L. Rav. 791 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Prosser, Fall]. See also infra notes 10, 14, 16, 23 & accompanying text.
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products.10 As a result, consumers, as well as bystanders in many jurisdictions, are now free to prove that the manufacturer either negligently
designed or manufactured a product that was a proximate cause of personal or property injury." Negligence, especially in conjunction with
res ipsa loquitur,' 2 remains a basic remedy for those injured by defec3
tive products.'
Warranty theory also was used as a basis of products liability. In
the leading case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. , 14 the court recognized
that express warranties can give rise to liability when the product fails
to perform as promised. Actions based on express warranties do not
require a showing of negligence and may compensate for economic in5
jury as well as for personal or property injuries.'
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,16 the New Jersey
Supreme Court articulated a concept of implied warranty of merchantibility and fitness borrowed from commercial code provisions. Unlike
the commercial codes, however, Henningsen did not require privity, '7
which would have restricted the use of implied warranties to the initial
buyer (often the product's distributor). 18 Henningsen also did not allow
other typical commercial statutory provisions such as general disclaimers and notice of claim requirements which can preclude liability.19
20
Other courts also judicially altered commercial code provisions,
in effect establishing a special set of rules for consumers suffering per10. 217 N.Y. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
11.

See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.

Rptr. 652 (1969); Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974).
12. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits negligence to be inferred from certain
circumstances in which it is more likely than not that the injury resulted from negligent
behavior, but no direct evidence of negligence can be produced. See generally RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 2, § 328D.

13. See, e.g., Montez v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 315, 161 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1980); Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1971); see also Noel, Manufacturers'LiabilityforNegligence, 33 TENN. L. REv. 444 (1966);
Rheingold, The ExpandingLiability ofthe Product Supplier. A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV.
521, 531 (1974).
14. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
15. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965); Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cynamid Co., 1 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 266 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
16. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
17. Id
18. Id.
19. See Prosser, Assault, supra note 9.
20. See, e.g., Wright Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnott, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E.2d 713 (1956);
Silverstein v. R.H. Macy & Co., 26 A.D. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1943).
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sonal and property injuries caused by defective products. 2 1 This judicially created theory of implied warranty allowed consumers to sue for
damages resulting from products that failed to meet consumer expectations of fitness, without requiring them to establish negligence or the
22
existence of an express warranty.
The Move Toward Strict Products Liability
In 1963 the California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products,Inc.23 established a theory of "strict liability" for product defects. Rejecting the need to base liability on warranty theory, Justice
Traynor asserted that "itihe remedies of injured consumers ought not
24
to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales."
Rather, a plaintiff need only establish that "he was injured while using
[the product] in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect
was not aware that
in design and manufacture of which the plaintiff
25
made the [product] unsafe for its intended use."
Instead of tinkering with established commercial law and statutory
contractual theories of implied warranties, Justice Traynor threw the
contractual baggage overboard. If the product was defective and a
proximate cause of injury to the consumer, the manufacturer and
merchant who distributed the goods would be held liable for personal
26
and property injuries.
The Greenman decision's logic appeared compelling and was followed two years later by the final published draft of section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 27 The Restatement endorsed the Green28
man "strict liability" concept with some modification in language.
The strict liability concept in products liability became immensely popular and was adopted with remarkable speed in a majority of the
21. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 655-56.
22. In many jurisdictions, the legislature adopted amendments to its commercial code
which reflected some or all of the liberalization imposed in Henningsen. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1790 - 1797.5 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983); ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § I - 316(5);
see also U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-316, 2-719 (1977).
23. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
24. Id at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (quoting Ketterer v. Armour & Co.,
200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)).
25. Id at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
26. Id
27. See W. PROSSER, i. WADE & V. SCHwWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 761

(7th ed. 1982).
28. See RESTATEMENT 2d § 402A, quoted supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
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Efforts to Articulate the Concept of Design Defect
The Restatement: Unreasonably Dangerous

The appealing simplicity of the Greenman formula for holding
sellers of goods liable for their defective products has proved deceptive.
Although the requirement of proving negligent behavior by manufacturers or sellers has been eliminated, the courts must nevertheless determine what is in fact a defective product.

The term "manufacturing defect," though not undebated, 30 has
not posed significant conceptual difficulties. A manufacturing defect is
readily identifiable because the product differs from the manufacturer's
intended result.31 It is predictable that even in the absence of negligence, some random products will have an unintended manufacturing
defect. Reasonable precautions in the manufacturing and distribution
process allow for reasonable risks that a random item will be flawed.
The elimination of all risks in the manufacturing process is economically unfeasible if the product is to be made available. Strict liability
for manufacturing defects insures that the costs of the predictable risks
of manufacturing defects will be incorporated in the cost of the product. Since such risks are foreseeable, the risks can be rationally in-

sured. Compensation can be distributed to those injured by receiving a
32
product different from what was intended to be sold.
Determining what in fact is a design defect has proved much more
elusive and controversial.3 3 The drafters of the Restatement's section
402A attempted to clarify the Greenman concept of a defective product.
29. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 87 n.1 (Fla. 1976) (listing 33
states in addition to Florida that have adopted or approved the doctrine of strict products
liability); see also Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1057 § 4 (1967); PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) §§ 40604070.
30. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 443 (1972), suggesting there may be difficulty in distinguishing what is a manufacturing or design defect: "It is difficult to prove that a product ultimately caused injury because a widget was poorly welded-a defect in manufacture-rather than because it was
made of inexpensive metal difficult to weld-a defect in design." The California Supreme
Court later rejected this concern and established separate tests for design and manufacturing
defects. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 554, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 236 (1978). See also infra text accompanying notes 54-57.
31. See Wade, supra note 5, at. 551-52.
32. But see Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973). See
infra text accompanying notes 116-19.
33. See Birnbaum,supra note 5; Fischer, ProductLiability-The Meaningof Defect, 39
Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974); Henderson, supra note 5; Schwartz, UnderstandingProductsLiability, 67 CALIp. L. REv. 435 (1979); Traynor, supra note 5; Wade, supra note 5.
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Liability is imposed against the sellers of "defective products unreasonably dangerous. ' 34 The term "unreasonably dangerous" is defined as
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by

the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge

common to the community as to its characteristics. ' 35 The addition of
the "unreasonably dangerous" phrase is intended to exclude from the

concept of "defectiveness" products such as whiskey which cannot be
36
made entirely safe for consumption.

Although the Restatement's language is accepted by many states
adopting strict products liability, it has not eliminated controversy over

what is encompassed by the concept of a defectively designed product.37 Some courts have sought to clarify the Restatement by attempt-

ing to define what product dangers are beyond the expectations of
ordinary consumers. 38 Although the Restatement language suggests an
objective standard, some courts applying the Restatement have looked
at the subjective knowledge and expectations of the particular plaintiff.39 Because the ordinary consumer expects some reasonable risks
from products, other courts utilizing the Restatement standard ask the
jury to balance the risks versus benefits of a product.40 This has raised

the question of whether the ordinary consumer would balance risks
versus benefits any differently than the reasonable manufacturer, and
also prompts the question whether the Restatement standard is signifi34. RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 2, § 402A(1).
35. Id comment i.
36. Id;see Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in Caiffornia, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9,
23 (1966).
37. See Birnbaum, supra note 5, at 601.
38. See, e.g., Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 115-16 &
n.2, 587 P.2d 160, 163 & n.2 (1978); Vincer v. Esther Williams All Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co., 69 Wis.2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (1967).
39. See, e.g., Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1971); Garrett
v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 498 P.2d 1359 (1972); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453,
472, 242 S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978).
40. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W. 2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Estate of
Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
The Texas Supreme Court, in Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.
1979), endorsed a risk-utility balancing test without requiring that jurors be asked what
ordinary consumers would expect. The court was "persuaded to this conclusion by the inconclusiveness of the idea that jurors would know what ordinary consumers would expect in
the consumption or use of a product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard or
test outside that of their own experience and expectations." Id at 85 1. Prior to Turner the
Texas Supreme Court had endorsed section 402A. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc.,
416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
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cantly different from an ordinary negligence standard. 4 ' Other courts
have interpreted the Restatement standard to impose liability when the
"seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risks
involved,' ' 42 even when the manufacturer would not be at fault for fail43
ing to predict those risks.
Consequently, although the Restatement standard has "swept the
country," 44 the difficulty of achieving consensus as to what is meant by
a design defect persists. This has prompted some jurisdictions to reject
section 402A and articulate alternative standards.
California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania have developed particularly fascinating responses to the Restatement. Viewed together, they
underscore the flaws in current design strict products liability theory
and suggest that the distinct concept of strict products liability, as contrasted with traditional strict liability and negligence, may be no more
than a temporary theoretical interlude.
California: An Elusive Standard

In Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp.,45 the California Supreme Court
rejected the Restatement position that strict liability for a product defect requires finding the product "unreasonably dangerous." Cronin
dealt with a manufacturing defect rather than a design defect. 46 The
court concluded that the Restatement's requirement that a defect be
"unreasonably dangerous" imposed on the plaintiff the burden of prov47
ing an additional "element which rings of negligence.
41. See Birnbaum, supra note 5, at 648-49.
42. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974)
(emphasis in original).
43. See, e.g., id; Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978), reh'g
denied with opinion 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978), endorsed this interpretation of section 402A. Subsequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court, while continuing to
endorse a hindsight approach, rejected adherence to section 402A. Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). See infra notes 75-90 & accompanying text. The hindsight approach has been endorsed by Deans Wade and Keeton. See
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973);
Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture andDesign of
Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. Rv.559, 568 (1969).
44. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 655-56.
45. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
46. The "unreasonably dangerous" modifier would seem particularly significant in this
context, because it could be argued that a production error was not "unreasonably dangerous" even ifin a particular instance the defect caused injury. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
20 Cal. 3d 413, 424-25, 573 P.2d 443, 450-451, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232-33 (1978).
47. Id at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.

January 1983]

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY STANDARDS

537

The court in Cronin also reasoned that by defining "unreasonably
dangerous" in terms of ordinary consumer expectations, liability under
the Restatement would be eliminated when obvious hazards or specific
warnings notified the consumer of the product's dangers. 4 8 Industrywide laxity in product safety development and implementation could
also serve to lower consumer expectations. 49 The Restatement standard appears to impose on manufacturers and sellers of products notice
requirements derived from the implied warranty tradition of products
liability, but arguably goes no further.
The California court has also expressed dissatisfaction with the
ambiguity of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous," which is potentially misleading to juries. Arguably, an "unreasonably dangerous defect" would suggest to some jurors an intent to limit liability to only
abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous defects, 50 although such an
interpretation was presumably not intended by the drafters of the
51
Restatement.
In Cronin, the California Supreme Court rejected section 402A,
but did not offer an alternative definition of "defectiveness." Six years
later, in Barker v. Lull EngineeringCo. ,52 the court attempted to do so.
While Barker clearly purports to define a design defect, three footnotes
reserving decision on ostensibly peripheral issues leave undecided
whether strict liability for product design exists in California in any53
thing but name.
Barker adopted two alternative tests to determine product design
defects. The first test requires that "the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner. ' 54 The test is essentially the Restatement's, which is itself a contemporary version of implied warranty the48. Id; see Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-RestructuringAssumption ofRisk inthe
ProductsLiabilityArea, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1974); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does not
Make a Right: Manufacturers'LiabiityforPatently DangerousProducts, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1065 (1973).
49. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,425, 573 P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal. Rptr."
225, 233 (1978).
50. Id. at 246 n.8, 573 P.2d at 452 n.8, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234 n.8. See Prosser, supra note
36, at 23; Wade, supra note 43 at 832.
51. See RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 2, § 402A comment i.
52. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). The opinion was

unanimous.
53.

See infra notes 64, 67, 105 & accompanying text. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at

482-93.
54.

20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
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ory and suffers from the limitations noted by the court in Cronin.55
Barker acknowledges these limitations, but finds the standard appro56
priate when consumer expectations have not been met.
The alternative Barker standard finds a product design defective if
the plaintiff proves that "the product's design proximately caused his
injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors
• . .that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the
57
risk of danger inherent in such design."
The court in Barker was adamant that this second alternative does
not require the jury to find that the manufacturer was negligent in designing the product. 58 Instead, the court emphasized, the "jury's focus
is properly directed to the condition of the product itself, and not to the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct." 59 Nevertheless, in
weighing the benefits and risks associated with a product it is difficult
to appreciate any significant difference between a focus on the design of
the product and a focus on the act of designing that product. 60 Indeed,
efforts to make such a distinction have led some commentators to suggest that design strict products liability is little more than negligence
61
and should be abandoned.
There is, however, a potentially significant difference between negligence and strict liability as articulated by Barker's second prong. Although the phrase was not included in the definition of "defect" in
Barker, the opinion clearly states twice that the benefits versus the risks
62
of a product design should be evaluated on the basis of "hindsight."
Thus, although a reasonable manufacturer would not have appreciated
the defect in design at the time of manufacture and distribution, liability can still be imposed if, in hindsight, the risks of the design are per63
ceived as outweighing its benefits.
Hindsight is especially advantageous to the plaintiff if he or she is
55. See supra notes 48-49 & accompanying text.
56. 20 Cal. 3d at 425 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7.
57. Id at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40.
58. Id at 435, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
59. Id
60. In either case the risk of the product's design would be balanced against its benefits
in determining whether the product is defective or the designer is negligent. This balancing
is a classic element of negligence. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 145-49.

61. E.g., Birnbaum, supra note 5, at 648-49. The Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979), adopts a negligence standard to determine
whether a product design is defective. See Schwartz, The Uniform Product LiabilityAct-A
BriefOverview, 33 VAND. L. REV. 579 (1980).
62. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 434, 573 P.2d at 454, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236, 239.
63. Id.
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free to fault the manufacturer for a design which, in the light of subsequent technological advances, no longer constitutes a reasonable design

at the time of trial. The advancing "state of the art" might make intolerably dangerous what five years earlier might have constituted a reasonable risk in a product's design. Yet it is unknown whether a

plaintiff may apply hindsight in such a situation because Barker expressly reserved decision on whether "state of the art" should constitute
a defense, precluding strict products liability if the design reflected the

best state of the art at the time of production.64 "Mechanical feasibility" of a safer design, as opposed to state of the art, is enunciated in the

text as but one factor to consider in determining whether there is a
65
design defect.

Hindsight would also appear significant when a product poses a
hazard which a reasonable manufacturer should not have necessarily
discovered at the time the product was sold. 66 At the very least the
product in "hindsight" might be viewed as "defective" because the

manufacturer failed to provide a warning concerning such hazards.
Yet Barker, in another footnote, left undecided the question of how

strict products liability applies to products that are dangerous because
they lack adequate warnings or directions. 67 A prior appellate decision
in California 68 declined to apply strict products liability based on lack
of warning in a defective drug case, upholding a jury verdict finding no

pharmaceutical manufacturer because the
negligence on the part of the
69
injury was unforeseeable.

In light of these two potential exceptions, very little, if anything,

70
may be left of the benefits of hindsight to the plaintiff in California.

64. 20 Cal. 3d at 422 n.4, 573 P.2d at 449 n.4, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231 n.4.
65. Id at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. The opinion does not specify
whether "mechanical feasibility," even as but one factor, is evaluated at the time of manufacturing or at the time of trial.
66. An unforeseen side effect of a pharmaceutical product is a classic example of where
a warning advising consumers of the risk would be appropriate if the manufacturer knew of
the danger. The product would then be utilized when therapeutic considerations justified
the risk or the patient was known not to be susceptible to the particular risk.
67. 20 Cal. 3d at 420 n.1, 573 P.2d at 447 n.1, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229 n.1.
68. Christofferson v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1971).
69. Id at 79-80, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 827. The California Supreme Court may address this
issue in Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co. (2d Civ. 57164, unpublished). A decision from the Court
is pending. See 81 CALIF. TORT RFTR. 82 (1981).
70. Arguably, there still may be some distinction between the results of a risk-balancing based on foresight and hindsight. It may not, for example, be negligent to have failed to
include an additional safety device until accidents indicated that the cost of the additional
device would significantly reduce injuries and justify the added cost. Such subtle distinc-
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While hindsight without a "state of the art" or "warning" exception
insures that strict design products liability is different from negligence,
the two Barker footnotes leave open the possibility that "hindsight"
would be so eviscerated as to destroy the distinction and effectively
make the second prong of the Barker test a "product focused" but nevertheless negligence test.
The matter-of-fact manner in which "hindsight" is provided for in
Barker, with no policy analysis, leaves doubt as to what the Barker
court meant to accomplish through inclusion of the hindsight language. 7 1 One might argue that imposing hindsight without a "state of
the art" exception provides additional compensation to the injured and
encourages the prompt improvement of products to limit the risks of
future liability. 72 Yet "hindsight" analysis could discourage new state
of the art advances as well. Obsolescence through technical improvements could retroactively make the earlier products not merely obsolete
but also "defective." Furthermore, compensation would appear to be
random with some plaintiffs winning major recoveries and others being
denied recovery as a result of litigating too early, before the state of the
art advances sufficiently to make the product defective by hindsight.
From a compensation perspective, it would also seem arbitrary to compensate, for example, victims of obsolete drug therapy while not compensating the victims of obsolete medical procedures. Finally,
hindsight would appear to offend traditional notions of fairness. Liability would be imposed haphazardly and without a good mechanism
to allow manufacturers to calculate potential risks.
Barker, despite its protests to the contrary, 73 leaves unanswered
whether strict design products liability as a distinct theory of liability
even exists as a practical matter in California, and offers no compelling
policy reasons why it should. What may in fact be left is a mature
implied warranty standard in prong one and a sophisticated design
negligence standard with an unusually aggressive variant of res ipsa
loquitur in prong two.74 Barker's second prong does shift the burden to
tions, however, are muted by the fact that the jury is measuring reasonable foresight from a
hindsight perspective.
71.

See Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in ProductsLiability, 69 CALIF. L.

Rnv. 919 (1981).
72.

See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,207, 447 A.2d 539, 547-48.

See also infra text accompanying note 82.
73.

20 Cal. 3d at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.

74. See supra notes 12-13 & accompanying text. While ordinary res ipsa loquitur permits the inference of negligence, Barker requires the defendant to prove the absence of a
defect (not necessarily the result of negligence) when the product caused the injury. See
Schwartz, supra note 33, at 467.
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the defendant to prove a reasonable design when the plaintiff proves
that the product is a proximate cause of the injury, even where negligence would normally not be inferred. This has practical significance
in litigation but hardly justifies the label of strict products liability.
The Barker opinion speaks in terms of strict products liability, but the
alternative tests, in the absence of hindsight, look very traditional.
New Jersey: Unmitigated Hindsight

The New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville
ProductsCorp. 75 expressly endorsed the concept of hindsight in design
defect cases. The determination of whether a product "is reasonably
fit, suitable and safe" depends upon a traditional negligence analysis
which utilizes a "risk-utility" equation. 76 The only difference between
negligence and strict liability in the context of alleged product design
defects is that all knowledge concerning the dangers of the products
that can be proven at trial is considered in determining whether the
product is defective. The defendant's lack of knowledge of the dangers
is irrelevant.

77

While the Barker decision reserved the issue of whether strict
products liability applies to failure-to-warn cases, the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that the same principles apply in warning
cases as in any alleged design defect case. The court must determine
whether a product is safe by balancing its utility against its potential
risk and by asking whether the "risk [has] been reduced to the greatest
extent possible consistent with the product's utility. 781 Since the cost of
adding a warning is normally negligible and would rarely diminish
utility, the failure to provide an appropriate warning would constitute a
79
design defect.
The court in Beshada rejected the argument that "state of the art"
should provide a defense for failure to warn. The court reasoned that
in strict products liability it is not only irrelevant whether a reasonable
manufacturer should have known about a particular risk, but it is also
irrelevant that the risk was undiscoverable given the state of scientific
knowledge at that time.80
75. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
76. Id at 199, 447 A.2d at 544.
77. Id at 200, 447 A.2d at 544.
78. id at 200, 447 A.2d at 545 (quoting Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J.
229, 238 n.1, 432 A.2d 925, 930 n.1 (1981)).
79. Id at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.
80. Id at 202-05, 447 A.2d at 545-49.
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Since Beshada is a failure-to-warn case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court did not have to decide whether "state of the art" could be a defense for a product which in hindsight is defective because it lacks technological improvements developed after the product's manufacture and
sale. While the court reserved decision on the question, it noted that
"[there are strong conceptual similarities between warning and safety
device cases" and that arguments against permitting a "state of the art"
defense may be equally applicable.8 '
The Beshada court rejected arguments that its decision would result in unacceptably high prices, contending that its decision would advance the policies underlying strict liability, primarily risk-spreading
and accident-avoidance. 82 The court concluded that the price of a
product should reflect the cost of injuries caused by the product, including the cost of insuring against the possibility that the product will
be defective. 8 3 In addition, the court reasoned that spreading the cost
of injuries among all those who produce and distribute the product is
better than imposing the cost solely on "innocent victims" who suffer
injury from the product. 84 Finally, the court concluded that imposing
the cost of the failure to discover hazards on manufacturers creates an
incentive to advance safety research and ultimately avoid accidents.
The New Jersey decision articulated a distinct approach to strict
products liability by expressly adopting a hindsight approach. The
court recognized the difficulties in endorsing hindsight and then undercutting the concept by allowing a "state of the art" exception.8 5 The
concept of scientific knowability was deemed not a relevant issue for
juries to focus on. 86 Both the "state of the art" exception and the concept of scientific knowability focus on the culpability of the manufacturer. The Beshada court recognized that in products liability cases the
culpability of the manufacturer is not at issue.
Beshada, unlike Barker, clearly endorses a concept of strict products liability based on unmitigated hindsight. Yet the policy arguments
offered on behalf of "hindsight" products liability are inadequate. If
the price of a product should reflect the costs of injuries resulting from
it, it appears arbitrary to compensate those injured as a result of risks
that are in retrospect unreasonable, but not those injured from foresee81.

Id at 204 n.6, 447 A.2d at 546 n.6.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id at 205-07, 447 A.2d at 547-48.
Id at 205, 447 A.2d at 547.
Id at 206, 447 A.2d at 547.
Id at 202-05, 447 A.2d at 545-49.
Id at 208, 447 A.2d at 547.
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able, though not unreasonable, risks recognized at the time of manufacture. Indeed, it is the foreseeable risks of harm that are most insurable
and should most appropriately be reflected in the cost of doing business
by those who profit from the product.
The Beshada court cited a discussion of traditional strict liability
by Dean Prosser in support of risk-spreading through hindsight liability.8 7 Yet Prosser, in that discussion, emphasized that strict liability is
imposed for risks that are foreseeable, although not unreasonable. s8
The victims of such risks are innocent compared with those who benefit
from imposing risks even if the risks are reasonable:
[Ilt might be quite as easy to say that one who conducts ... operations which may injure his neighbor is "at fault" in conducting them
at all, and is privileged to do so only in so far as he insures that no
harm shall result, as to say that he is not at fault, but is liable nevertheless. If he is not "at fault" because the social desirability... justifies the risk, his conduct is still so far socially questionable that it
does not justify immunity. The basis of his liability in either case is
the creation of an undue risk of harm to other members of the
community.8 9
It must also be emphasized that traditional strict liability imposes
liability only for foreseeable (albeit reasonable) risks. Proximate cause
analysis, which tends to be more rigorous in the context of strict liability than for liability based on negligence, precludes responsibility for
unexpected types of harms.90
Hindsight analysis removes any element of culpability. Liability
may be imposed even where no risk of harm was forseeable at the time
of manufacture. Indeed, hindsight analysis eliminates some incentive
to discover such risks. Once discovered, the knowledge of the risk may
be used against the manufacturer to show that the product is defective.
Once the causal relationship between product and risk is established,
massive liability is imposed. In addition, compensation is afforded to
some, but not all, victims. Incentives for improvements are at best diffused rather than directed at minimizing foreseeable risks. While traditional strict liability allows statistical predictions of potential liability
based on foreseeable risks, hindsight does not. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to include in the product's price the cost of future
liability.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id at 205, 447 A.2d at 547.
See W. PRossER, supra note 2, at 495.
Id.
Id at 517.
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Pennsylvania's 4zzarello Decision: The Court Determines Policy
In Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.,91 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that even if the Restatement's phrase "unreasonably dangerous" served "a useful purpose in predicting liability in this area, it
does not follow that this language should be used in framing the issues
for the jury's consideration. ' 92 Rather, the court characterized the Restatement phrases "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" as "terms of art to be invoked when strict liability is
appropriate. '93 The determination of when strict liability is appropriate is described by the Pennsylvania court as a question of law, the
resolution of which "depends on social policy ' 94 and is a judicial rather
than a jury function. 95 The jury simply determines whether the facts
96
are as the complaint alleges.
Azzarello has been heavily criticized for imposing an unduly harsh
standard for liability. 97 In defective design cases, the court determined
that strict liability should be imposed whenever the jury finds "the
product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to
make it safe for its intended use."9 8 Azzarello, however, leaves undefined what constitutes a "safe" product. While any product can be
made "safer," Azzarello doesn't necessarily say that a product is unsafe
because it lacks any element that can make it safer.99 Such an interpretation would result in strict liability for virtually all products. Rather,
Azzarello says that a product must be "safe," and leaves uncertain
what elements are necessary to make it safe.
Azzarello is also criticized for unjustifiably giving to the judge
functions more appropriate for the jury. 10 0 Traditionally, however,
strict liability has been imposed by the court upon those engaged in
activities characterized as "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally dangerous."' 0 1 Indeed, the revised Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes
that a social policy analysis rather than a fixed rule should guide courts
91.
92.

480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
Id at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.

93. Id (emphasis in original).
Id

94.
95.

Id

96. Id.
97. See Bimbaum, supra note 5, at 636-37.
98. 480 Pa. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027.
99. For the argument thatAzzarello requires a product to be completely safe, see Bimbaum, supra note 5, at 637; Henderson, Products Liability, 2 Cor. L. Rlv. 246, 247-48
(1979).
100. See Birnbaum, supra note 5, at 636-39.
101.

See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 505-16.
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in iniposing strict liability.10 2 Such a policy approach to questions of
strict liability for particular products is not conceptually different from
a policy approach to questions of strict liability for "abnormally dangerous" activities. Azzarello admittedly is not suggesting the Restatement standard should apply to products as well as to activities, but it
should not be faulted for proposing an analogous procedure in the context of products liability.
While the Azzarello court asserted that judges should determine
when strict liability should be imposed for product design defects, it
failed to clearly articulate a meaningful standard for determining when
a design is defective. As a result, the jury may be left to determine
when a product is "safe for its intended use." Azzarello stated that the
court and not the jury should, on the basis of social policy, determine
when strict liability is applicable. While quite properly emphasizing
the need for policy and the court's role in defining it, the Azzarello
opinion ultimately fails to articulate it.
The Case for Traditional Strict Liability
Since Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 103 introduced the
concept of strict liability for product defects, courts have sought to define what standards would lead to liability. The struggle has in part
reflected a tension between liability derived from implied warranty and
negligence theories.
The Restatement reflects this mixed tradition by defining the negligence concept of an "unreasonably dangerous" defect in terms derived from warranty theory of the ordinary consumer's expectations.
The California Supreme Court in Barker, while rejecting the Restatement, offered two tests which may constitute little more than alternative bases of liability: warranty in one test and negligence in the other.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has also mixed the language of warranty and negligence: "[flitness for intended and foreseeable use" is
required in the terminology of implied warranty, but defined by a risk102. RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 2, §§ 5 19-520. Section 520 lists the criteria for determining what constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity: "In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered: (a) existence of a
high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that
the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to
which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes."
103. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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utility equation derived from negligence.'o
Whatever terminology is used, the same problem faces the courts
in the context of strict liability for design defects. So long as strict
liability depends on determining that the product is defective, an adequate measurement for ascertaining what is a design defect must be
formulated. This has proved a persistently elusive goal. While the Restatement has won many adherents, the task of defining defect in terms
of ordinary consumer expectations is sufficiently ambiguous to evade
the issue.
The ambiguity of the Restatement standard has generated a variety of responses. Some, likeAzzarello, attempt to formulate a theory of
liability while maintaining marginal allegiance to section 402A.
Others, like Barker, expressly reject the Restatement's terminology.
Yet Barker also begs the question. Is defectiveness simply a product
design that constitutes an unreasonable risk? If so, it would appear that
strict product liability for design defects is nothing more than negligence. If unmitigated hindsight is imposed, as in Beshada, a test significantly different than negligence is indeed formulated. If, as Barker
leaves undecided, hindsight is limited by a "state of the art" defense, or
if strict liability theory is entirely excluded from failure-to-warn cases,
the difference between hindsight analysis and negligence analysis begins to evaporate.
Unmitigated hindsight as articulated and defined by Beshada fails
to offer a persuasive policy rationale. Hindsight may be a neat way to
define defects, the enigma facing courts since Greenman, but defining
so-called design defects is not the ultimate issue.
The real issue is, as Azzarello points out, a question of formulating
a policy governing when those injured by products should be compensated by those responsible for putting the products in the stream of
commerce. The Beshada hindsight approach, as argued above, is essentially arbitrary in discriminating among the injured it compensates.
It fails to give direct incentives for accident avoidance, since liability
can be imposed for risks that are not even recognized, much less
avoided. The unforeseeability of the risks makes economic planning,
insurability, and the rational spreading of accident costs among all consumers extremely difficult.
Traditional strict liability does not, however, pose these difficulties. It is for this reason that the possibility of liability devoid of the
concept of defect becomes attractive. A footnote in the Barker opinion
104.

90 N.J. at 199-200, 447 A.2d at 544.
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noted that the court "[ijn the instant case [has] no occasion to determine whether a product which entails a substantial risk of harm may be
found defective even if no safer alternative design is feasible."' 1 5 The

"liability might
court quoted Justice Traynor's earlier suggestion that
06

be imposed as to products whose norm is danger."'
If hindsight, unmitigated by state-of-the-art and warning excep-

tions, appears to impose arbitrary and unfair liability, Justice Traynor's
suggestion might at first blush appear even more arbitrary. Barker sug-

gests the possibility of imposing absolute liability for injury proximately caused by a product without the necessity of establishing that
the product is defective. It has been observed that the footnote may

suggest a traditional strict liability analysis imposing liability where a
product is viewed as "abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous."' 0 7
While its fairness has been questioned, 108 the imposition of traditional

strict liability against the manufacturers of abnormally dangerous
products is not as radical as it may first appear, and in fact is far more
equitable than a design strict product liability formulation based on
hindsight.
Traditional strict liability is not absolute liability. Liability is limited to activities where the defendant should recognize that serious risks

remain despite the exercise of reasonable care. 09 The social utility of
the activity justifies the unavoidable risks that are imposed on others by

the activity, thus precluding a finding of negligence.1 ' 0 Although the
risk is reasonable, it is also calculated, and the resulting injury is in a
105. 20 Cal. 3d at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.10. The Azzarello opinion contains an analogous footnote noting that "[u]nder the facts of this appeal
we need not consider when the risk of loss is placed upon the supplier in cases where an
unavoidably unsafe product is involved. . . ." 480 Pa. at 559 n. 11,391 A.2d at 1027 n.ll.
106. Id (quoting Jiminez v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482 P.2d 681, 684,
93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 772 (1971)).
107. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 490.
108. Id. at 491. Courts have rejected, as misplaced, without serious policy consideration, occasional efforts to apply the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine in the products
liability context. See Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); First
Nat'l Bank v. Nor-American Agricultural Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App.
1975). See also W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY: CASES AND MATERiALS 200-01 (1980). But see Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215
Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949), where traditional strict liability was arguably a factor in
the majority's decision to impose liability. Oregon initially appeared to limit liability for
"defective" products that were ultrahazardous, Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301,
405 P.2d 624 (1965), but later abandoned this requirement. Caven v. General Motors Corp.
280 Or. 455, 571 P.2d 1249 (1977).
109. See W. PRossER, supra note 2, at 517.
110. Id at 494-95.
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sense statistically inevitable. III While the defendant is not to be faulted
for engaging in the activity (since a "reasonable" person in like circumstances would also engage in the activity), it is not inappropriate to
require the defendant to compensate those injured as a result of the
activity. The defendant's enterprise benefits from the abnormally dangerous activity and should therefore pay the inevitable costs. "Hindsight" analysis, on the other hand, by definition does not take into
account a reasonable person's contemporaneous scienter. While traditional strict liability can compel a defendant to pay for a particular
foreseeable but reasonable risk, "hindsight" strict products liability can
force a defendant to pay for an unforeseeable risk. This has implications not only in terms of "fairness" and culpability, but for economic
planning and insurability as well.
It does not seem unreasonably burdensome to require an industry
that benefits from the distribution of abnormally dangerous products to
compensate those injured by their use. While users of such products
are liable under strict liability, some may lack the financial ability to
compensate the injured. Adding the manufacturer, who is often more
financially stable than product users, to the circle of defendants subject
to strict liability would help assure that insurance covering potential
liability is procured. It also would encourage the manufacturer to distribute its product to responsible purchasers. While the actual "consumers" of the product have to a large extent assumed the risks,
thereby at least reducing their potential for recovery, the foreseeable
2
bystander would not be so precluded."
An example can illustrate the argument. Dynamiting constitutes
the classic situation in which traditional strict liability in the Ryland P.
Fletcher"13 tradition would be imposed on those engaging in the activity. Despite prudent precautions, the use of dynamite imposes risks.
Although the risks may be reasonable under the circumstances, they
are nevertheless foreseeable. In the case of such abnormally dangerous
activities, the cost of foreseeable injuries resulting from the blasting
must be sustained by those engaging in the activity.
The supplier of the dynamite is not liable under current strict
11.

Id at 495.

112. Assumption of risk is an established defense to strict liability. See id at 522-25.
Consequently, those engaging in abnormally dangerous activity would in many instances
assume the risks related to the products they are using and would be precluded from complete recovery, or enjoy only partial recovery in a jurisdiction where assumption of risk was
merged into comparative fault. See Daly v. General Motor Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d
1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
113. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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products liability theory, unless the product is "defective," however defectiveness is defined. Even the most extreme interpretation of Azzarello would require a finding by the court that a "necessary" safety
element was missing. Yet a strong case can be made that the supplier
who sells dynamite should be responsible for insuring that those injured by such a dangerous product are compensated. The cost of the
product should reflect the statistically foreseeable injuries resulting
from risks (albeit reasonable risks) that are imposed by use of the product. Yet currently, in the absence of a defect, the supplier is excluded
from the circle of liability. Accident avoidance would be advanced by
encouraging suppliers to sell only to responsible users. Yet, under present negligence theory, it is unlikely that even a "negligent" sale would
14
lead to liability.'
Furthermore, liability would only be imposed for foreseeable risks
associated with the hazards that justified imposition of strict liability.
These are the risks that can be predicted and properly insured. If dynamite was found in hindsight to cause cancer, traditional strict liability
would not impose liability. A hindsight analysis on the other hand, as
in Beshada, would impose liability to the benefit of those bringing suit
at a time when the state of the art adequately documented the
causation.
Traditional strict liability is limited by the defense of assumption
of risk in the cases where the plaintiffs have voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk. In jurisdictions which incorporate assumption of risk
into comparative fault, the limitation would be less extreme." 5 In addition, a criminal or grossly negligent use of the dynamite that was not
foreseeable would probably constitute a superseding cause, precluding
liability to the manufacturer.
In short, expanding traditional strict liability to particular products
when social policy suggests that the cost of the product should include
insurance for foreseeable risks is far less disruptive and radical than a
hindsight approach. Culpability, foreseeability and predictable economic liability are still relevant. In hindsight theory culpability and
foreseeability are abandoned.
Traditional strict liability clearly should be imposed on the manufacturers of products that are abnormally dangerous in all uses and
applications. Examples of such products presumably would include
very dangerous chemicals and pesticides, explosives, rockets, and cer114. See Sikora v. Wade, 135 N.J. Super. 62, 342 A.2d 580 (1975).
115. See supra note 112 & accompanying text.
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tain radioactive materials.' 6 By imposing the costs of accidents resulting from the use of such products on the manufacturer rather than
entirely on the user, an incentive is created for the manufacturer to
engage in research and development of a safer product. It is unlikely
that liability for negligence alone would be sufficient incentive to
prompt such research, for negligent failure to invent new and safer
products is difficult to prove." 7
Economic pressure on the manufacturer seems appropriate, since
it is the manufacturers of such abnormally dangerous products that
have access to information (which may at times constitute trade secrets)
necessary for the efficient pursuit of a safer product. 18 Although users
of such products are now liable under traditional strict liability concepts for injuries caused by activities involving the products, and thus
may apply pressure for safer products to reduce their costs, this pressure is indirect. The manufacturer, which is in the best position to
organize and direct safety research, is under present standards insulated from the direct economic pressure created by tort liability.
If the costs of foreseeable accidents were included in the price of
an abnormally dangerous product, consumers of such a product would
be forced to pay in advance for the foreseeable risk of accidents. This
forced payment, included in the price of the product, would provide an
incentive to users of the product to avoid imprudent risk-taking.119
Compensation of victims of accidents caused by the use of the product
would also be better insured, because the cost of such insurance would
already have been paid to a party liable for such compensation. The
more abnormally dangerous the risk imposed by the product, the less
116. This would apply to products which create abnormally dangerous activities regardless of location. Section 520(d) of RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 2, lists "inappropriateness
of the activity to the place where it is carried on" as one factor to consider. See .upra note
102. But see Yukon Equip. Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska
1978), expressing criticism with considering location in any case: "The reasons for imposing
absolute liability on those who have created a grave risk of harm to others by storing or
using explosives are largely independent of considerations of locational appropriateness.
We see no reason for making a distinction between the right of a homesteader to recover
when his property has been damaged by a blast set off in a remote comer of the state, and
the right to compensation of an urban resident whose home is destroyed by an explosion
originating in a settled area. In each case, the loss is properly to be regarded as a cost of the
business of storing or using explosives. Every incentive remains to conduct such activities in
locations which are as safe as possible, because there the damages resulting from an accident
will be kept to a minimum." See infra note 120.
117. Posner, supra note 32, at 209 n.9.
118. See Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
119. Posner, supra note 32, at 210 n.12.
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likely it is that a third-party victim will have calculated the risk in planning his or her own economic protection. Consequently, it becomes
essential to force manufacturers to distribute the risk created by their
products by passing on a small share of the burden to all users of the
product. 120 This is especially important in situations where the risk is
of liability for large damage awards, and the typical user of the product
is not financially capable of paying such awards.
As a product becomes more common, the manufacturer has less of
a monopoly on the technology and detailed knowledge of risks posed
by the product's use. The competition to build a safer mousetrap, for
example, and the incentive to do so, are more pervasive. The need to
impose special incentives on the manufacturer, beyond liability for
negligence, appears less intense. Similarly, the victims of such products
can at least take account of these foreseeable risks in their economic
and insurance planning.
Arguably, traditional strict liability should be extended to include
other products, in addition to those identified with abnormally dangerous activities. But the issue of what activities and what associated
products should be subject to traditional strict liability is part of the
larger question of negligence versus strict liability. What is important
in the context of design products liability is the recognition that the
focus should be on determining when to impose real strict liability and
upon which products, not upon trying to define design defect.
Conclusion
Since Justice Traynor's deceptively simple opinion in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products,Inc. ,121 courts have struggled with the concept of
strict products liability. Most of the debate and confusion has focused
120. Location of the activity utilizing the product is irrelevant for purposes of determining manufacturer liability under this analysis. See supra note 116. Obviously, product users
of abnormally dangerous products in remote locations would expect to be liable less often
since fewer accidents affect third parties. This raises the question of whether the proposed
rule of liability for manufacturers is unfair in so far as it passes on the costs of accidents
occuring in urban areas to rural users.
The objection is not well taken. Alternate systems of selective marketing and pricing
will come into effect. Since the traditional strict liability standard would not be applicable to
products commonly used, by definition, liability under this approach would focus on the
kind of products where this type of selective marketing is feasible. See RESTATEMENT 2d,
supra note 102, § 520(d); see also supra note 102. Certainly responsible selective marketing
of abnormally dangerous goods is to be encouraged. But see Montgomery & Owens, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Defective Products, 27
S.C.L. REv. 803, 825-28 (1971).
121. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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on design defects. The confusion stems from the courts' focus on the
definition of "design defect" rather than on the policy reasons for requiring one who is responsible for putting a product into the stream of
commerce to compensate those injured by that product. While a majority of state jurisdictions adhere to the concept of strict liability for
"design defects," the standards used are often ambiguous and confusing. The Restatement's standard for section 402A is so vague that different courts ostensibly adhering to section 402A endorse a variety of
conflicting theoretical approaches. "Design defect" may refer to nothing more than a product that has been negligently designed. If that is
the case, much confusion to litigants and jurors would be avoided if
negligence theory was used openly. Other jurisdictions have clearly endorsed liability based on "design defects" which are determined in the
light of hindsight. Such an approach, while distinct from negligence,
lacks a compelling policy rationale. Risk-spreading and insurability
are made difficult by the lack of a system of liability based on foreseeable risks. Accident prevention is difficult because the risks are not
foreseen. Safety research which could discover a causal relationship
between the product and injuries may be discouraged by a recognition
that hindsight can impose liability. The notion of liability based on
some fair notion of culpability is absent.
Traditional strict liability is based on foreseeable reasonable risks.
Risk-spreading and insurability are consequently feasible. Manufacturers and distributors, who benefit from the product's sales, should be
subject to the same kind of liability as those who used the product. At
present, traditional strict liability is limited to those engaging in "abnormally dangerous" activities, as defined by judges. It should, at the
very least, also apply to those manufacturing and supplying dangerous
products which substantially contribute to making such activities abnormally dangerous. Arguably, other product manufacturers and suppliers and other activities should be subject to strict liability. This is
part of the larger question of determining when traditional strict liability should supplant negligence. The real confusion in products liability
today is in failing to see the choices in terms of strict liability and negligence. Focusing on what is a so-called "design defect" obscures consideration of the policy choice between a reasoned system. of strict
liability and negligence.

